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BOOK REVIEWS
Challenge To Freedom.
Brothers, 1943.

By

HENRY M. WRISTON.

New York: Harper &

Challenge to Freedom is a persuasive declaration of faith in the traditional
American concept of life and government. In the preface, Dr. Wriston,
President of Brown University, states his thesis thus: "The principal duty
of democratic government is the maintenance and expansion of freedom.
Without expanding freedom the state will not long serve its citizens; the
process will be reversed and the citizen will become first a subject, then a
slave."
The first four chapters delineate the fundamentals and the regression of
freedom in America. Democracy, the author explains, is grounded upon
several fundamental postulates which may not be compromised. It is based
upon, the assumption that "reason governs mankind." It is based upon a
recognition of the infinite worth of the individual-"not the relative worth,
not the financial worth, not the economic potential, but the spiritual worth
of the individual human being." It is based upon a deep conviction concerning the capacity of men to govern themselves and upon a passionate faith
in the possibilities of progress.
Because these fundamentals have been discounted, the author contends, we
have had ten years of defeatism in America, as elsewhere in the world. Ours
was the "mood of defeat." Our. faith in democracy lost its dynamic character. We became "obsessed with a sense of failure," and our statements
about democracy were often "so defensive in tone that they sounded more
like indictments." Political leaders lost faith both in our economic system
and in the processes of representative government. They became obsessed
with the idea of a "mature economy"--the concept that America had grown
up and that the possibilities of future economic progress were at an end.
It is this defeatist point of view, the author believes, that has led to centralization of government, regimentation and managed economy. "A nation
in which individuals had created the steamship, the automobile, the airplane,
the telegraph and cable, the telephone, the modern technique of broadcasting, which had achieved the highest standard of living and the broadest
scale of philanthropy in the world, lost faith in the ideal of individualism
which had made all those things possible. It coasted downhill toward statism
and governmental management of housing, finance, transportation, farming,
education-and all the rest. It discounted the creative impulse and turned
to the dreary business of manipulation."
In all this, there is an interesting parallel with the eighteenth century, the
author points out. Then, as now, an'attempt was made by governmental
planners to control industry, trade and agriculture--"the bureaucrats of
the eighteenth century plowed under the vineyards of France." But the
system of that day broke down. It led to deficits, depression, confusion.
"The regulations became so complex, the bureaucracy developed so strong
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a vested interest, that ultimately reform by the legislative process became
hopeless." Hence, Dr. Wriston concludes that bureauracy, regimentation,
and managed economy are not elements of liberalism. "Government by
bureaucracy, control of business by administrative regulation, manipulation
of the economy for political purposes-these are stark reaction."
Beginning with Chapter V and continuing through Chapter X, Dr. Wriston particularizes his indictment of the defeatist philosophy of government
and life. In Chapter V he discusses the capital market and avers that
experience of the last ten years "reveals a government hostile to enterprise
capital." He lists the following barriers to new equity finance: tax legislation "citnningly devised to obstruct stock issues," "punitive taxation and
the anticipation of heavier and heavier taxes because of the mounting federal
debt," waste and extravagance of public expenditures which "gave evidence
that the budget would never be balanced," and bureaucracy and complex
regulations which made "prompt and adequate financing through equity
capital practically impossible." The author then shows how governmental
policy discouraged the issuance of common stocks; how regulation of the
securities market, designed to produce a more stable market, actually rendered it less stable and active; and how tax laws, regimentation and complicated procedures stifled small business and prevented its expansion. Dr.
Wriston does not argue against the wisdom of reasonable regulation of the
capital market or of business. He is concerned with techniques and with
that kind of governmental regulation "so intent upon preventing wrongdoing that it obstructed right-doing, so much concerned with evils of the
past that it was not adequately concerned with necessities of the present or
demands of the future."
In Chapters VI, VII, and VIII, the author places managed economy and
free enterprise in the balances and shows wherein the former is wanting.
He exposes the fallacy of unlimited deficit financing and shows that it was
primarily an executive policy which often became "the policy of Congress
without any affirmative action by the Congress itself to directly declare
such a policy." He likewise exposes the fallacy of administrative management, or "bold social engineering" as the planners called it, and shows that
the analogy is deceptive as well as false. He concludes that planned economy
is "the greatest modern assault upon freedom, and the more dangerous because it fights under the banner of economic democracy." The only alternative in his opinion is "the system of free enterprise, upon a democratic basis
-the achievement of economic democracy by concerted effort of many
citizens." That is "rational democracy."
It should be emphasized that the author does not build a case for laissez
faire. On the contrary, he offers a "via media." One of the most lucid
statements in the entire book is this: "We are not faced with the choice between impotence and tyranny, between laissez faire and dictatorship. We
can pursue the third alternative, which is the characteristic American solution: a framework of laws which establishes and defines the orbit of action
but leaves the individual free to move within that orbit. That leaves room
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,for decentralization, even to the point of individualism, without losing
coherence."
Chapters IX and X show quite dearly how planned economy 'and administrative management have undermined our constitutional system of representative government. Here the author presents a powerful array of striking
and irrefutable facts in support of his assertions. In Chapter IX he deplores
centralization of power in the federal government and the consequent weakening of the states. "What starts as 'assistance' to the states," he says, "develops
into something quite different ....
The process now'being followed removes
government further and further from the control of the citizen.. Indeed it
seeks to substitute administrative technique for alert citizenship. .

.

. Cen-

tralization, far from strengthening the democratic process, makes government
vulnerable to pressure group tactics."
The author concentrates his attack on administrative management in
Chapter X. First, he discusses the growth of administrative agencies land
their abuse of power. Second, he exposes the reforming zeal of many of the
newer agencies. Third, he shows that zeal for reform leads to disrespect
for law and constitutional procegses on the part of these governmental
agencies-in short, to "extra-legal government." Fourth, he points to the
multiplication of governmental corporations and credit agencies as another
"effort upon the part of administrators to escape the restrictions of the governmental process." And finally, he discusses and illustrates executive
assault upon the legislative process. This chapter is an able and convincing
attack upon bureaucracy. One cannot read it 'without acquiring a clear-cut
understanding and appreciation of the distinction between government by
men and government by laws. The method of bureaucracy is always government by men. Through its sometimes brazen and sometimes cunning devices,
timeless constitutional principles are pushed into the background as something
to which men pay only lip service. Nothing could do more to strengthen
the faith of our people than a "manifest respect for law, belief in the governmental process, and patience and fairness in observing its procedures."
Moreover, these are the qualities which "would rouse interest in freedom
everywhere in the world."
In the final chapters of the book, the author looks to the future. He examines the possibilities of "full employment," the problem of security and the
implications of privilege-all in relation to the development of a virile and
dynamic democracy. He places freedom ahead of safety, opportunity ahead
of -security. He pleads for repudiaion of administrative management and
for re-establishment of the democratic process, for repudiation of the economy
of scarcity and, for encouragement of full and efficient production, for an
end to defeatism and for a revival of faith in the individual. Such a program,
he believes, is the road to freedom. It is the road of liberalism. It is the
road of progress. ,
Those who agree with Dr. Wriston's thesis, and have faifh to believe that
the best in American life is yet to be, will close the book with a new sense
of duty and with a renewed conviction that only through courageous and

1944 1

BOOK REVIEWS

415

dynamic faith-not defeatism-will America achieve her mission in the
world.

wlJohn

W. Bricker*

Columbus, OJzio
Sachsenspiegel and Bible. By Guino KiscE.
of Notre Dame Press. 1941. Pp. ix, 198.

Notre Dame: University

The Sachsenspiegel, written probably between 1215 and 1235, is one of the
oldest and most voluminous monumeits of medieval German prose. Its author, a learned nobleman, Eike von Repgow, wrote this compilation of laws
and customs first in Latin, but, upon the request of Count Hoyer of Falkenstein, rewrote it in German. Called Sachsenspiegel (Mirror of the Saxons)'
because by looking into it the Saxons could read their law "such as women
look at their faces in a mirror," this book was merely a private study, lacking
the force of law. Its reputation, however, spread so fast that courts and
legislators soon recognized it as authoritative; we also find adaptations of it
in the Dutch and Czech languages.
To the student of English legal history this success seems hard to explaifi.
Compared to Ranulf Glanvill's Tractatus de Legibus and Bracton's De Legibus Angliae, the legal thought of the Sachsenspiegel appears to be primitive,
in parts even barbarous; its organization, too, is haphazard. We find provisions referring to private law, criminal law, the constitution and procedure
of the courts, constitutional and feudal law all thrown together with only
feeble attempts to put them in some orderly sequence. While Bracton,
schooled by his study of Roman law, treats his subject-matter both dexterously and profoundly, his contemporary, Eike von Repgow, limits himself
to a reproduction of German legal concepts which, in some instances, are
expressed as proverbs rather than as laws.
Professor Kisch's attempts, however, to acquaint an English-speaking public
with the Sachsenspiegel is a meritorious undertaking. Not only is the Sachse'nspiegel written in a characteristically forceful and picturesque language,
showing the clarity of expression in a primitive civilization, it is also a fascinating "mirror" of medieval Germany's social structure. The hierarchy of
"estates" from the King downwards and the constitution of different courts
for the 'several estates are clearly developed.
National, or rather tribal consciousness appears to have been so strong
that the Pope himself was denied the power to change Saxon law under one
of the rules; but this rule, as well as thirteen others, the articuli reprobati,
drew the fire of Papal ban, Pope Gregory XI issuing his bull, Salvator humani
generis, against them in 1374. The necessary concomitant of this tribal char*Governor, State of Ohio.

1The name "mirror" for a lawbook is not unknown in the history of English law.
The "Mirror of Justices," written in the late 13th century, is an example; it is interesting
to note that this "Mirror" traces the ancestry of the English people back to the Saxons.
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acter of Saxon law was stress on the preservation of the family and of
family property. A disproportionately large number of rules is devoted to
questions of the legitimacy and status of the offspring when one parent was
of lower birth than the other. Another chief topic is the sale of real property,
which transactions required the consent of the future heirs and, if executed
without *such consent, could be avoided by them.
Guido Kisch, a refugee scholar of great distinction, has undertaken the
difficult task of introducing the Sachsenspiegel to the American public. With
the zeal of the expert thoroughly versed in his subject, Kisch extols Eike von
Repgow as "the greatest German jurist of the Middle Ages." Eike is credited with having written "the first literary work on German law." He knew
Roman law "only from hearsay." This accounts for the primitive character
of his exposition as well as for the absence of attempts at rationalization.
Professor Kisch's thesis, however, is that Eike's writings are not exclusively
based on Germanic tradition, but are strongly influenced by a profound
knowledge of the Bible and a deep religious conviction, as illustrated by his
statement, "Law and God, God and Law are one."
Kisch engages in a controversy with other German legal historians who
claim that Eike possessed only a superficial knowledge of the Bible, or derived his knowledge not from the Vulgate directly but through intermediate
sources. By a juxtaposition of 46 passages from the Sachsenspiegel and Eike's
second important work, the Saxon World Chronicle, and a number of quotations from the Vulgate and some other sources, Kisch attempts to prove
the extent of Eike's familiarity with the Scriptures. We may readily grant
that the evidence offered shows Eike to have been acquainted with the legends'
and commands of the Bible. On the other hand, the point at issue, namely,
whether Eike's knowledge of the Bible was merely superficial or very profound, seems of minor importance, as the text of the Sachsenspiegel contains
quite a few explicit references to the Scriptures. We cannot be surprised that
an educated German nobleman of the thirteenth century was acquainted with
the Bible, as the .Bible "to Eike von Repgow and his time ... was the
ultimate source of all law."
Kisch's proofs convince one less of Eike's profound, than of his comprehensive knowledge of the Gospel; the attempts at showing a Biblical trend of
thought in the Sachsenspiegel seem labored and in some instances even
specious. A casual study of the text shows that the bulk of the statements is
of Germanic origin, and that Biblical events or commands comprise only a
small, although appreciable, part.
It is forgivable that Professor Kisch attempts, maybe unconsciously, to
counteract the sickening dithyrambs blared forth by the present-day German
ruling clique in praise of Germany's glorious cultural past, by showing that
this monument of German legal history contains an admixture of Biblical and
especially Jewish thought. But the passages of Kisch's book dealing with
the influence of the Old Testament and of extra-Biblical Jewish thought are
the weakest in his study; the reasoning is not convincing, and some of-the
statements are admittedly mere conjectures. Wherever we find references
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to the Old Testament, they are generally mere bits of narration (such as
the use of the Book of Genesis in the Saxon World Chronicle) ; but even
where the Old Testament is used as a source of law, as it is in the Sachsenspiegel, the use is due to its being part of Holy Writ, rather than due to its
Jewish character. Thus, it is used as a Christian, not as a Jewish source.
That Eike von Repgow was not familiar with the prevailing interpretation of the Bible but, rather, -strongly influenced by pagan dogma is evident
from the fact that his work found disfavor in the eyes of the Church authorities. The chapter on Jewish thought in the Sachsenspiegel is based on
some coincidences, e.g., the jugglery with the mystical number Seven (which,
incidentally, is mentioned almost 400 times in the Bible itself) and some
other instances which can be related to the Sachsenspiegel only by a tour de
force of reasoning. The only cogent proof of Eike's acquaintance with Jewish
civilization is his reference to the origin of the special protection accorded
the Jews. Here Eike follows the Jewish tradition, according to which the
promise of protection was given to Flavius Josephus for curing Emperor
Vespasian's son of the gout; the German kings, considering themselves successors of the Roman emperors, kept the Roman's promise of protection to
Josephus' fellow-Jews.
Dr. Kisch's study, which is accompanied by an excellent bibliography, may
be recommended as a guide to primitive Germanic law. The controversy
about the history of the sources of the Sachsenspiegel will interestlegal historians; however, the limitation the author imposed upon himself by examining only Biblical and Jewish influences on the Sachsenspiegel prevents the
book from being what, written by a scholar of Professor Kisch's standing, it
might have been: a broader refutation of the preposterous claims of the
"master race" for German cultural supremacy, and the relegation of the
Sachsenspiegel to its proper place in the development of law.
Henry R. Bernhardt*
Ithaca, New York
World Court Reports: A Collectipn of the Jfudgments, Orders, and
Opinions of the Permanent Court of International Justice.' Edited
by MANLEY 0. HuDSON. Volume IV, 1936-1942. Washington: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 1943. Pp. xvi, 513.
In Volume IV of World Court Reports, judge Hudson has printed the
relevant English texts of the ten cases which came before the Permanent
Court bf International justice from 1936 to 1940. The volume contains
eight judgments (two cases remaining on the docket when the Court's
activities were suspended in 1940) and sixteen orders. Ohe judgment was
given in 1936, three in 1937, one in 1938, and three in 1939. Of the states
which had resort to the Court during this period, Belgium was a party in four
*Instructor, Army Specialized Training Program, Cornell University.
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cases; France, Greece, Hungary, and Yugoslavia, in two each; and Bulgaria,
Estonia, Italy, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, The Netherlands, Spain, and Switzerland, in one each.
Study of the cases reveals that a disproportionate amount of time was
spent by the Court' in considering preliminary objections to its jurisdiction,
although the Court's jurisprudence (including some able dissenting opinions)
contains interesting and -valuable discussions of the nature and rationality of
international claims, the rule of local remedies,,the diversion of international
rivers, and questions of tfeaty interpretation (in particular, treaties and
declarations conferring jurisdiction on the Court).
In a section entitled "Instruments dnd Information Relating to the Court,
1936-1942," Judge Hudson prints, with valuable editorial and bibliographical
notes, the amended Statute of the Court (as in force since February 1,
1936), the Rules of the Court adopted on March 11, 1936, declarations made
by various states with reference to the so-called Optional Clause, and various
other documents. The amount of labor and scholarly care which went into
the editing of these materials will be apparent only to those who have sought
such information themselves.
It is obvious that in the pre-war years the Permanent Court of Interinational Justice had scarcely enough cases to keep it busy. The most serious
unsolved problem connected with the international judicial function is not.
a judicial, nor even an organizational problem, but the political problem of
inducing states to resort to the Court for the settlement of disputes in which
they make a claim of right. The Court is at present in a state of suspended
animation, with the Registry and the President 'in Geneva instead of at The
Hague. The Court can meet immediately after the war without further
action by' states. The future peace settlement may well be able to secure
a wider acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. The United
States, for- its part, might properly submit to the Court by executive
agreement with other states any international legal claims outstanding at
the end of the war in Europe, even prior to any action by the Senate on the
still pending World Court protocols.
Herbert W. Briggs*
Ithaca, New York

Law of the Construction Industry in New York State-A Practical
Handbook. By CHARLES HOWARD LEvITT. Rochester, N. Y.: Northeast-

ern Retail Lumbermens Association, Inc., 1943. Pp. xxi, 550.
As no author could deal adequately with all of the law of the construction
industry in a single volume, Mr. Levitt has wisely made no attempt to do so
in his. Much of' the ground marked out by his broad title is left unworked.
The book, for example, contains no chapters on the common law of lateral
and subjacent support, building codes, collective bargaining, workmen's corn*Professor of Government,

Cornell University.
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pensation, trade associations or liability for negligence. The reader will find,
however, a discussion of the terms of construction contracts and contracts
for the sale of structural materials, a delineation of the rights and duties of
parties to such contracts, and an exposition of the ways and means of securing payment to building contractors and materialmen. If there be any doubt
that the subject matter selected is sufficiently extensive to justify 550 pages,
an examination of the volume will dispel it.
The book begins with eleven chapters on the New York mechanics' lien
statute. In this part essential terminology is explained and the following topics
are discussed: services and materials for which liens may be filed; the consent of the land owners as prerequisite to the lien; the contents, filing and
service of the notice of lien; the coveiage, duiation, discharge and loss of the
lien; assignment of liens; priorities; and the trust and larceny provisions of
the lien statute.
Next appears a chapter about bonds and the liability of sureties. This is
followed by three chaptets on construction contracts. The first deals with
the right of the subcontractor or materialman to inspect the main contract.
The second is entitled "Interpretation and Construction of Contracts," and,
after a discussion of general principles, takes up numerous specific provisions, such as those concerning arbitration, architects' certificates, building
permits and extras. The third expounds the law in regard to performance,
with sections "on substantial performance, part performance and recovery
therefor, and various excuses for nonperformance.
The author then offers six chapters on the conditional sale contract. After
pointing out the importance and general nature of such contracts and the
necessity of including in them accurate descriptions of the goods they cover,
Mr. Levitt defines the important words and phrases employed in the conditional sales statute. The filing sections are then explained, and the threefold
classification of fixtures adopted in New York is described. Next follows detailed information as to the rules governing the determination of conflicting
claims to fixtures of the several classes; e.g., prior mortgagee of. the land
versus the conditional seller of Class III fixtures; subsequent mortgagee of
the land versus the conditional seller of class II fixtures; general creditor of
the conditional buyer versus the conditional' seller of class II and class III
fixtures. A score of such specific problems are considered. The material on
conditional sales also includes a chapter on the rights and duties of the parties to the contract, in which retaking of possession, resale and other matters
are touched upon; and concludes with a brief chapter on cancellation and
discharge.
Four chapters on the outright sale of structural materials constitute the
next main division of the book. In this group the terminology of the Sales
Act ig explained; the rules concerning the necessity of a written memorandum
are discussed; and the buyer's right to inspect the goods is enlarged upon.
Warranties, passage of title, delivery, and the remedies of the seller and buyer
against each other are treated at length.
The next to the last chapter deals with the anticipatory breach of both con-
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struction and sales contracts; and the main body of the book ends with an
exposition of the National Housing Act and Consumer's Credit Regulation W.
The appendices occupy 108 pages of the volume. A reprint of the priority
and trust provisions of the New York Lien Law constitutes the first appendix. This is followed by a set of about twenty-four forms to serve as guides
in the preparation of documents such as the following: notice of lien, assignment of lien, satisfaction of lien, demand upon lienor for itemized statement,
assignment of bid, conditional sale contract, and statement as to the realty
to which conditionally sold fixtures are to be affixed. Next appear three pages
of information in regard to special clauses in negotiable instruments, and
the presentment and protest of checks and drafts.
There is also an appendix in which suggestions are offered with respect to
checking credit risks and methods of collection in the construction business.
The credit problems which are peculiar to the industry are discussed, and
the various steps which should be taken in dealing with the several types of
persons encountered in it are pointed out. Thus there are separate sections on
builders, contractors, subcontractors and materialmen.
The next appendix consists of a table of cases supporting the statements
of law made in the text; and the last one provides a table by resort to which
the reader may discover at what pages certain statutes are explained or referred to.
In view of the breadth of its subject matter, Mr. Levitt's book is brief. Its
text is as free from technical legal language as is consistent with accurate
expression. The author's selection of material has been primarily controlled.
by functional rather than doctrinal considerations. In short, it is, as its
author says, a practical handbook.
This volume should be invaluable to an attorney representing any party to
a contract for construction or for construction materials, if the use which
the attorney makes of the book conforms to its purpose. Should his client
get into litigation, a lawyercould not adequately brief the case without resort
to works containing a more thorough development of the principles involved
and a more complete citation of authorities than does .Mr. Levitt's. On the
other hand, when disposing of the numerous questions which will be put to
him from time to time in the regular course of business by his construction
industry clients, the lawyer can refer to this book with confidence. Many
such problems, though involving several fields of the law, must be disposed
of almost as soon as they arise. When confronted with them the lawyer
needs a work in which are conveniently collected and arranged those parts
of the law of Agency, Contract, Crimes, Fixtures, Insurance, Liens, Mortgages, Property, Sales, Suretyship, Trusts, etc., which are pertinent to construction and construction material contracts, and which at the same time contains reminders and expositions of the practical considerations of which he
dare not lose sight. Mr. Levitt's book fulfills this need.
Laymen erigaged in the contracting and building supply industry will likewise welcome this handbook. It will not, of course, equip them to be their
own lawyers, nor was it intended to do so. It should, however, help the lay-
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men to decide when to employ counsel. In addition, by giving him an understanding of his legal problems, it should make it easier for him to present the
facts of his case to his attorney fully and accurately, and so to receive greater
benefit from his professional services. And finally, it can serve as a guide
in occasional emergencies when no lawyer is immediately available.'
For Mr. Levitt's book, the successful career envisaged for it in the foreword contributed by the Honorable William F. Bleakley can safely be predicted.
William H. Farnham*
Ithaca, New York
The Conscientious Objector and the Law. By JULIEN
York: The John Day Company, 1943. Pp. x, 158.

CORNELL.

New

"In the forum of conscience duty to a moral power higher than
the State has always been maintained."
CHIEF JUSTICE CHARLES EVANS HUGHES.'

During or after every war there have appeared one or more books dealing
with the experience of those individuals who, through loyalty to conscience,
have been unable to participate in that war.2 The first such publication in
the United States during this conflict is the handbook, The Conscientious
Objector and the Law. The book is not a personal history, nor yet a case
study or general history like most of the former manuscripts, though in
the chapters on the Phillips and Eichel cases it borders on the case-study
'In order to obtain opinions concerning Mr. Levitt's book from competent laymen,
the reviewer arranged to have it read by Mr. Arthur N. Gibb, F.A.I.A., one of America's
leading architects, and by Mr. Donald McPherson, one of the foremost building contractors in this vicinity.
Mr. Gibb said: "I find it . . . tremendously informative from the standpoint of an
architect.... Mr. Lev'itt's book, I, think, should be in the office of every architect, owner,
contractor and real estate agent."
Mr. McPherson expressed himself as follows: "I . . . believe most men in the building
industry would get a great deal from reading it and using it as a reference manual.

As a matter of interest, I looked up various legal problems that have.come up in my

business experience, and found them handled in a way which I could understand and

because the language used was my language, instead of an almost incomprehensible legal
terminology. It gives a contractor a better idea of the legal aspect of his business, and

would guide him as to when he should see his lawyer. This ,is a book we have been
looking for for a long while."
*Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.
1

United States v. Macintosh, 283 U. S. 605, 633, 51 Sup. Ct. 570, 578 (1931).

2

KELLOGG, THE CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR; GRAHAM,

CoNscRI'riON AND CONSCIENCE

WRIGHT, CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS IN THE CIVIL WAR (1931); THOMAS, IS
CONSCIENCE A CRIME (1927); POLLARD, CONSCIENCE AND LIBERTY (1940); PRINGLE,
THE RECORD OF A QUAKER CONSCIENCE (1918) ; GRAY, CHARACTER BAD (1934) ; SIMON,

(1922);

LA LIBERTf DE CONSCIENCE (1857); MARILLIER, LA LBERT- BE CONSCIENCE (1890);
BOUGLE, LIBERT DE CONSCIENCE (1892).
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technique. It is rather, as the title indicates, restricted to a consideration
of 'the legal aspect of pacifism and specifically of that aspect under Section
5 (g) of the Selective Training and Service Act of 194CP which provides:
"Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to require any person to be subject to combatant training and service in the land or
naval forces of the United States who, by reason of religious training
and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any
form. Any such person claiming such exemption from combatant
training and service because of such c6nscientious objections whose
claim is sustained by the local board shall, if he is inducted into the
land or naval forces under this Act, be assigned to non-combatant
service as defined by the President, or shall, if he is, found to be
conscientiously opposed to participation in such non-combatant service,
in lieu of such induction, be assigned to work of national importance
under civilian direction.
The book therefore compares only with -the earlier writings of William
Humphrey, Conscience and Law, and the unpublished master's thesis of
Paul Gia Russo, The'History of Religious Pacifism in Avwrican Law. 4
The author is a young New York attorney who by virtue of being a
Friend (Quaker) can grasp the current problems of conscience against a
background of continuous opposition to war. As counsel to the National
Committee on Conscientious Objectors of the American Civil Liberties
Union and attorney in many of the cases referred to in the text, he had
the opportunity and ability to observe and evaluate the operation of the
Selective Training and Service Act as it applies to the conscientious objector
(sometimes referred to as C. 0. or pacifist).
The book begins with a frank recognition that Section 5 (g), whether
adequate or inadequate, was drafted by two Quakers who were not lawyers,
Paul French and E. Raymond Wilson-a way of saying that the pacifists
had a hand in making their own legal bed and have themselves to thank
for any corn husks in the mattress. It ends with the recognition that "although engaged in t.e most dangerous war of all history, our government
granted legal recognition to conscientious 6bjection . .. [and attempted]
to apply legal processes to the classification ....
This is a great achievement
...

for civil liberties in wartime." These sentiments would be echoed by most
pacifists who appreciate the generous treatment they have received as
members of a minority group. But between these two "poles" of the book
lie expressions-some temperate, some intemperate, and some quite torridwith which many pacifists would not agree. Mr. Cornell's criticism of the
actual operation of the camps and America's failure to embody the liberal
English provisions for ,court hearings and for significant social work for
the C. 0. in the community where he lives rather than "made work" in
isolated camps is mild enough. But the author's antipathy to the National
354 STAT. 885, 50 U. S. C. (App. 1940) § 305 (g).

"University of Chicago, 1940.
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Service Board for Religious Objectors and "Washington officialdom" is only
too apparent. His attack on General Hershey and Selective S~rvice certainly generates more heat than light. 5
The book must be read for what it is-a handbook and guide for laymen.
It is written in lay language for the conscientious objector, who by law is
not permitted counsel at his hearing or appeal. For this purpose it is
accurate and hard to excel. The author's outline of procedure is simple and
without flaw. In addition to the procedural chapters, ,3 to 6, the volume
contains thirteen additional chapters in which Mr. Cornell deals in nontechnical language and with sufficient accuracy for the average layman with
the legal problems interesting to the conscientious objector and his adviser:
prison and parole; the meaning of "conscientiously" and "religious"; double
jeopardy; the right of a pacifist to public office and the meaning of the oath
of allegiance; a minute comparison' of the American and British draft
procedure; and such constitutional questions as the legality of conscription
in peacetime; the adequacy of the notice and hearing provisions; whether
it is involuntary servitude for the C. 0. to receive no pay for his service,
no allowance for his family and be compelled to pay $35.00 per month for
his "keep"; whether the Civilian Public Service camps are "under civilian
direction" as required by Section 5 (g) when controlled by the Selective
Service Office, staffed largely by army personnel.
If the lawyer, law teacher or law student seeks to find Mr. Cornell's
text a thoroughgoing treatment of the legal pioblems discussed, he will be
disappointed. He will find areas where the study is incomplete and lacks
legal penetration. The author's criticism of the definition by the Selective
Service Office of "religious training and belief" is either unsound or is an
attempt to reargue an issue already decided adversely by Congress. For
Congress did not cause the decision of who is a conscientious objector under
Section 5 (g) to turn solely on "conscientiously" but upon conscience
produced in a partic4darananner-"by reason of religious training and belief."
One may properly believe that Congress' decision was unwise, but this
belief does not justify a condemnation of a .legally accurate administrative
interpretation of statutory language. Mr. Cornell makes no attempt to
discover the accepted legal definition of "religious." No definition revealed
in Words and Phrasesor a recognized dictionary is substantially more liberal
than that of General Uershey to which Mr. Cornell takes violent exception
at page 19:
"reared in the environment of a religious civilization and exposed, if
only subjectively, to its ethical concepts .

.

. from which may be drawn

the inference that he recognizes a Deity or power above and beyond
the human."

I do not find this definition to differ from that in the Kauten case 6 which
r'This may be seen in the author's criticism of the General's definition of "religious,"
of his acts by which paroles are "persistently blocked," of the military character of
Selective Service's control of the Civilian Public Service camps.
"United States v. Rauten, 133 F. (2d) 703, 708 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943).
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the author accepts as correct, or in the early Supreme Court case of Davis
v. Beason,7 or in the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Hughes in United
States v. Macintosh,8 or in the great variety of court opinions which recognize
a conception of the relationship of the individual to some power outside and
beyond oneself as the essence of religion.
The author's discussion of the right of a pacifist to hold public office and
the meaning of the oath of allegiance is legally incomplete. He fails to distinguish between oaths such as that found in 5 U. S. C. § 16: to "support and
defend the constitution of the United States against all enemies foreign and
domestic ...without any mental reservations," and those like the attorney's
oath and the postal employee's oath in 5 U. S. C. § 365 which ormit all or
part of the italicized words. In the Maciiltosh case9 the Supreme C6urt
did not, as Mr. Cornell implies, hold that a pacifist was unable to become
a citizen-or hold office because he could not take the oath. It did hold that
a person who said that "he was not a pacifist" could not impose the qualification that he should have the right to decide when he would and would not
bear arms upon taking the oath to "defend the constitution against all
enemies, foreign and domestic." The book fails to define carefully the limits
of this and similar decisions. Nor does it call attention to the ruling of the
United States Civil Service Commission that a conscientious objector may
properly subscribe to the federal employee's oath without thereby abandoning
his pacifist position.
It is in the areas of constitutional and administrative law that the text is
least penetrating and accurate.
Mr. Cornell discusses the question of
"involuntary servitude" without any reference to the cases decided under
the "work or fight" statutes of the First Worlq War and without attention
to the related issue of discrimination. He concedes what many constitutional
lawyers who are not pacifists would not admit-that the right to follow religious conviction, even to the extent of refusing to serve in the army and
take life, is not a constitutional right but may be granted or withheld in
the discretion of Congress. These issues surely require more careful analysis.
The author evidences a dislike for administrative procedure which he constantly refers to as "Star Chamber" proceedings. It is doubtless this attitude which prevents his sixth chapter on Judicial Review of Draft Boards
from presenting a sound analysis of the rules of judicial review. He seems
to be asking for more favorable treatment for conscientious objectors than is
obtained by others subject to administrative process, and to be reiterating
criticisms of administrative law long outmoded.
My task as a reviewer has been to state what this little volume does and
7
"The term 'religion' has reference'to one's views of his relations to his Creator, and
to the obligations they impose of reverence for his being and character, and of obedience
to his will." Justice Field in Davis v. Beason, 133 U. S. 333, 342, 105 Sup. Ct. 299,
300 (1890).
,
'"The essence of religion is belief in a relation to God involving duties superior to
those arising from any human relation." Chief Justice Hughes, in United States v. Mac283 U. S. 605, 633, 51 Sup. Ct. 570, 578 (1931).
intosh,
9
1'bid.
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does not contain and to evaluate its merits and shortcomings. As a handbook for the laymen, for which purpose it apparently was prepared, it is
excellent. As a legal analysis of the facets of conscience and law to which
the serious student of civil liberties and constitution law may turn, it will
Harrop A. Freeman*
prove elementary.
Williansburg, Virginia
Judah P. Benjamin: Confederate Statesman. By ROBERT D. MEADE. New
York: Oxford University Press. 1943. Pp. ix, 432.
Although Judah P. Benjamin as a Confederate statesman rceeived considerable treatment in Hendrick's Statesmen of the Lost Cause Mr. Meade
goes into more detail on Benjamin generally and with more of the apparatus of
scholarship. His footnotes, bibliography and so on make a monumental
work; but Mr. Meade has not lost Benjamin the man. Competent, crafty,
clearheaded, a man of brains among men with less brains, a man of courage
among men who had plenty of courage, Benjamin was also a man of resource.
He rebuilt his life while others mourned among the ruins of theirs. Though
a pillar of the Lost Cause, Benjamin had little of the southern aristocrat
about him, in form or manner. Mr. Meade is earnest to point out that
Benjamin was of the Sephardic Jews; but the photograph shows him without the physical and facial comeliness of, say, Cardozo. Mr. Charles Pollock' remembers that Benjamin had an offensive voice. But one's heart
warms to Benjamin, the indomitable man. From poverty he carved his way
to place and fame in this country, and when the edifice of years of labor
tumbled here he escaped to England and restored his fortunes. He was a
cosmopolitan by birth and by temperament which made matters easier for
him; but he did it.
That British troops were occupying the Danish Virgin Islands when Benjamin was born on them in 1811 came in handy when he reached England
a refugee and claimed British nationality; but up to 1865 only two of his
54 years were spent under the British flag. In between he had gone to
Yale College for an education. Why he left Yale, if he left voluntarily or
was expelled, and in either event why, is treated by Mr. Meade apologetically. Benjamin thereafter settled in New Orleans, and when I lived there
thirty or more years ago, old men wearing the Confederate lapel button
told me what a lawyer he was and what a business man he was. They added
that if the men at Richmond who had got hold of the war-and mismanaged
it-had used Benjamin to run the civilian end and General Beauregard
to run the military aspects "things might have been mighty different around
here." They did not add that there was always a faint odor of distrust of
*Professor of Law, College of William and Mary.
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Benjamin. Mr. Meade, however, concedes that even southerners felt it.
Yet neither the United States of America nor the Confederate States of
America failed to use his talents. Mr. Meade says (p. 84) that he was offered a place on-the Supreme Court of the United States. 'By 1853 he was
a United States Senator. In the Confederacy. he first was Attorney General,
then Actinig Secretary of War-Jefferson Davis was actually his own Secretary of War. By late February, 1862, Benjamin was Secretary of State
and so remained until the Sunday when Lee's "It's all up with us" message
reached Richmond. 'Benjamin characteristically was at his office; the others
at church. The Confederate government then became itinerant, its dignified
withdrawal turning into flight as Confederate armies surrendered. As flight
turned into saue qui peut,the party of heads of state broke up and Benjamin became successively a Frenchman, a landseeker in homespun and
finally a cook on a boat, in which last guise he got through the Federal
Naval patrols to Nassau, thence to Havana and to England. He wavered
over staying in England or going on to France, but he went back to law
in England and Mr. Meade has about 50 pages left for "Benjamin the
British barrister." He enrolled at Lincoln's Inn on January 13, 1866, a
pupil of Charles Pollock, a specialist in commercial cases as Benjamin
himself had been in New Orleans and was to become in London. His entry
into the bar was made easy, though not as easy as he had hoped, but he got
his call within six months.
A year after he had been dodging arrest in the Florida swamps he was
ready for his new career. Litigations on issues arising out of the late war
in the United States early claimed his services. As these were cleared up
he appeared in marine insurance matters and in sales of goods cases following Ihis discreet advertising as the author of Benjamin on Sale.5 From the
outset he held his own with the best of the Londoners and at the end Mr.
Meade calls him "a leader of the British bar." Benjamin's fees were 15,000
pounds in 1878, Mr. Meade says, though he does not give a list of Benjamin's
cases except as he incidentally mentions them.
They include, however, many which have been stock in trade for American casebook makers: United States v. Wagner, 2 deciding that "the United
States of America" could sue in that form rather than by the President of
the United States or some other state officer as the ex-Confederate's defendants argued; United States v. McRae, 3 holding that the United States
as successor government to that of the Confederate states was entitled to
property in England held by ex-Confederate agents; The Queen v. Keyn 4
on criminal jurisdiction for death on board a British vessel resulting from
collision in British waters with a German vessel. Benjamin appeared also in
the famous or infamous, if you like, Tihborne Will case-Castro v.'The
Queen.5
2

L. R. 2 Ch. App. 582 (1866).
3L. R. 8 Eq. 69 (1869).
42 Ex. D. 63 (1876).
56 App. Cas. 229 (1880).
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On whether Benjamin was a Queen's counsel, Mr. Meade says, p. 349,
that Benjamin was not made one. But in another famous case, Cundy v.
Lindsay,6 in the House of Lords, Benjamin is listed as "Mr. Benjamin,
Q. C.," as he is in other cases in the same volume. In this Cundy-Lindsay
case, which generations of American law, students have been trained on, a
rascal wrote letters as "Blenkarn" to Lindsay ordering- goods which Lindsay, knowing of a "Blinkiron" firm at the approximate address, then shipped.*
The rascal received the goods for which he did not pay, thereafter sold
them to Cundy, and departed leaving Lindsay facing Cundy. It is a wellknown illustration of the perennial puzzle of what to do with fraudulent
impersonation. Benjamin appeared in other cases which also have at least
law school history, but enough has been said to show the quality of the
man and to indicate the sort of book that Mr. Meade has written. The book
will probably be definitive on Benjamin as a Statesman, if not as a lawyer
under three flags.
G. 'H.ROBINSON*

Ithaca, New York
Reissued Notes on Bills and Notes. By ZFCHARIAH CHAFEE,
bridge, Mass.: Published by the author. 1943.

JR.

Cam-

Mr. Chafee's recent return, after 20 years, to the teaching of Bills and
Notes has, he says, occasioned reference to his old material. With some
1943 addenda he offers it as Reissued Notes Circulated After Maturity and
Indorsed for Collection Only. Payable at Langdell Hall, Cambridge, Mass.
If you advance $3.00 on this overdue paper, you get a reprint of Chafee's
articles run off from the same plates and maddeningly bearing the same
paging as in the original law reviews, along with various other items which
he found in his files.
The law review articles', "Rights in Overdue Paper," "Acceleration Provisions in Time Paper," "Reacquisition of a Negotiable Instrument by a
Prior Party," have had wide influence. Frequently cited by the courts, they
have been faithfully pillaged by professors. "What 'does Chafee say on
this?" is one of my own classroom war cries. These articles .entitle him
to high place and it is a convenience tcr have all of them in a single binding.
The other material consists of book reviews, notes and some hundred pages
of "Curbstone Opinions" cast in the form of A: a question from an old
student, a reader of Chafee's writings (he did the 4th edition of Brennan's
Negotiable Instruments Law, and some of his opinions are his own discussions in the 4th edition which later editors have omitted), or from just a
plain lawyer approaching the jurisconsult; and B: "Answer of Z. C. Jr."
Sometimes the inquirer talks back and draws a second answer. Occasionally
the inquiry opens: "Please wire your charge for your offhand curbstone
63 App. Cas. 459 (1877).
*Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.
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opinion," and Z. C. Jr. adds to his telegram: "Appreciate whatever advice
thought worth." Thrust and counterthrust of "Q" and "A" follow, ending
"Thank you for your generous check." Z. C. Jr. bought a dog with it.
I envy Chafee his forethought. He kept all his Q's and A's and now he
enables himself to join Gaius and Papinian. The material will interest any
lawyer with a bills and notes litigation on his hands, but if he looks for a
table of cases and an index he will find only an "Analytical Table of Contents" to the law'review articles.
G. H. Robinson.*
Ithaca, New York
*Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.

